Simulation and visualization of malware spread in a cloud-based collaboration environment

ABSTRACT

The technology disclosed simulates and analyzes spread of malware through an organization as a result of sharing files using cloud-based services. This analysis is based on actual user and file sharing characteristics collected on a user-by-user and file-by-file basis. The technology disclosed traces connections among the users by traversing a directed graph constructed from the user-by-user data and the file-by-file data. It then simulates the spread of malware, from an entry point user zero through the organization, via the cloud-based services, using the directed graph to simulate user exposure to, infection by, and transmission of the malware within the organization. It then produces a visualization of the spread from the entry point user zero, to users within a user partition to which the user zero belongs, at varying transmission distances from the user zero.

CROSS REFERENCE TO OTHER APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to and the benefit of U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 62/480,542, entitled “SIMULATION AND VISUALIZATION OFMALWARE SPREAD IN A CLOUD-BASED COLLABORATION ENVIRONMENT”, filed onApr. 3, 2017 (Attorney Docket No. NSKO 1012-1). The priority applicationis incorporated by reference for all purposes.

This application incorporates by reference U.S. Provisional PatentApplication No. 62/373,288, entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS OF DETECTINGAND RESPONDING TO A DATA ATTACK ON A FILE SYSTEM”, filed on Aug. 10,2016 (Attorney Docket No. NSKO 1005-1);

This application incorporates by reference U.S. Nonprovisional patentapplication Ser. No. 14/198,499, entitled “SECURITY FOR NETWORKDELIVERED SERVICES”, filed on Mar. 5, 2014 (Attorney Docket No. NSKO1000-2) (now U.S. Pat. No. 9,398,102 issued on Jul. 19, 2016);

This application incorporates by reference U.S. Nonprovisional patentapplication Ser. No. 14/835,640, entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS OFMONITORING AND CONTROLLING ENTERPRISE INFORMATION STORED ON A CLOUDCOMPUTING SERVICE (CCS)”, filed on Aug. 25, 2015 (Attorney Docket No.NSKO 1001-2); and

This application incorporates by reference U.S. Nonprovisional patentapplication Ser. No. 15/368,240, entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS OFENFORCING MULTI-PART POLICIES ON DATA-DEFICIENT TRANSACTIONS OF CLOUDCOMPUTING SERVICES”, filed on Dec. 2, 2016 (Attorney Docket No. NSKO1003-2).

FIELD OF THE TECHNOLOGY DISCLOSED

The technology disclosed relates to simulating and visualizing spread ofmalware in a cloud-based collaboration environment, and in particular,relates to simulating and visualizing spread of ransomware through anorganization of users who store and collaborate on files on cloud-basedservices.

BACKGROUND

The subject matter discussed in this section should not be assumed to beprior art merely as a result of its mention in this section. Similarly,a problem mentioned in this section or associated with the subjectmatter provided as background should not be assumed to have beenpreviously recognized in the prior art. The subject matter in thissection merely represents different approaches, which in and ofthemselves can also correspond to implementations of the claimedtechnology.

As the number of cloud-based services increases exponentially, there isan exponential increase in the possibility of a data attack by malware,and more specifically, by ransomware. Ransomware is a computer malwarethat installs on a user's local endpoint and then executes an attack onthe user's local endpoint by encrypting the user's files and thendemanding a ransom for the user's files to be decrypted. Ransomwarepropagates via electronic media and networks. Examples of media that cancarry a ransomware infection are email, exploit kits, removable drives,and external network shares. Ransomware often encrypts files to ensurethat the victim pays the ransom to get the decryption keys.

Users can unknowingly spread ransomware through the sync and sharemechanisms provided by the cloud-based services. Passive spread ofransomware and other infections among users that rely on file sync,share, and collaboration presents an increasing risk.

Virlock is a ransomware infection that encrypts files and also infectsthem, thereby making it a polymorphic file infector ransomware. Any userwho opens a Virlock infected file spreads the infection, causing theirfiles to become encrypted and infected, including files synced throughcloud-based services. Virlock ransomware in a cloud-based collaborativeenvironment presents a new propagation vector that has the ability todeliver malware on the fly and substantially amplify malware fan-outeffect.

An opportunity arises to prevent ransomware and other malware infectionpropagation. Proactive detection and implementation of appropriateresponse mechanisms that prevent users and organizations from being heldhostage to ransomware may result.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The patent or application file contains at least one drawing executed incolor. Copies of this patent or patent application publication withcolor drawing(s) will be provided by the Office upon request and paymentof the necessary fee. The color drawings also may be available in PAIRvia the Supplemental Content tab.

In the drawings, like reference characters generally refer to like partsthroughout the different views. Also, the drawings are not necessarilyto scale, with an emphasis instead generally being placed uponillustrating the principles of the technology disclosed. In thefollowing description, various implementations of the technologydisclosed are described with reference to the following drawings, inwhich:

FIG. 1 shows aspects of a system that implements simulation andvisualization of malware spread in a cloud-based collaborationenvironment.

FIG. 2 depicts different system sub-components used by the systemcomponents shown in FIG. 1.

FIGS. 3, 4, and 5 show various examples of user-by-user data andfile-by-file data regarding interaction of an organization's users withone or more cloud-based services.

FIG. 6 is a visualization based on a directed graph constructed from theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data regarding interaction of anorganization's users with one or more cloud-based services.

FIGS. 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E, and 7F are an example time-lapsedvisualization of malware spread simulation through an organization ofusers who store files on one or more cloud-based services.

FIG. 8 is a representative flowchart that illustrates a method ofsimulation and visualization of malware spread in a cloud-basedcollaboration environment.

FIG. 9 is a simplified block diagram of a computer system that can beused to implement the technology disclosed.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following discussion is presented to enable any person skilled inthe art to make and use the technology disclosed, and is provided in thecontext of a particular application and its requirements. Variousmodifications to the disclosed implementations will be readily apparentto those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined hereinmay be applied to other implementations and applications withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope of the technology disclosed. Thus,the technology disclosed is not intended to be limited to theimplementations shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistentwith the principles and features disclosed herein.

INTRODUCTION

The technology disclosed simulates and analyzes spread of malwarethrough an organization as a result of sharing files using cloud-basedservices. This analysis is based on actual user and file sharingcharacteristics collected on a user-by-user and file-by-file basis.

Not all users in an organization are connected by sharing of filesthrough cloud-based services. Partitions of unconnected users can beconstructed from data collected file-by-file through an administrativeinterface to cloud-based file collaboration data. The data is analyzedto create a directed graph, with read only files shared in one directionalong graph edges and editable, read-write files shared overbidirectional edges. Traversing the graph reveals which users areunconnected, which means not exposed to one another, directly or throughan exposure chain. Partitions divide users into mutually exclusivegroups that are not exposed to one another due to sharing of filesthrough cloud-based services.

Spread of malware from one user to the next, due to opening of infectedfiles shared using cloud-based services, can be simulated or analyzedbeginning at any entry point to the organization, any “user zero”. Userzero becomes infected due to the spread of malware from outside theorganization or other groups when user zero opens or executes aninfected file.

The risk faced by an organization can be more completely assessed byevaluating an external exposure surface, through which an infected filefirst reaches an organization. The hygiene of individual user endpointsand file sharing properties can be evaluated. In addition, the exposurerisk to others of the individual user endpoints and shared files can beevaluated.

Risk can be illustrated in animation(s), beginning at selected entrypoints. User zero can be selected randomly, randomly with weighting toreflect hygiene, or systematically to make a point. Risk can beevaluated by Monte Carlo trials and summarized as an aggregation oftrials. Risk can be evaluated on a partition-by-partition basis.

In addition to simulating potential future infections, the technologydisclosed can be used in reaction to a detected malware infection byspecifying all detected patients zero. The risk of malware infection canbe identified in a user partition to which the detected patients zerobelong. FIG. 6 shows a reactive simulation. In FIG. 6, user 604 isdetected as a patient zero who is capable of transmitting the malwareinfection to other users in the user partition 602.

The technology disclosed calculates a collaborative risk index (CRI) foreach user in the organization. The CRI is calculated based on multiplefactors including rate of collaboration of the user, rate of share,location of the user endpoint, type of the user endpoint, and userhygiene score. A CRI score for the organization is calculated byaggregating the individual users' CRI scores. These metrics help inproactive risk analysis of threats to valuable documents, individualusers and the organization as a whole.

In this application, certain concepts are claimed and explained in thecontext of “file objects” or “files”. These concepts apply equally to“folder objects” or “folders”.

System Overview

We describe a system and various implementations for providingsimulation and visualization of malware spread in a cloud-basedcollaboration environment. FIG. 1 shows an architectural level schematicof a system in accordance with an implementation. Because FIG. 1 is anarchitectural diagram, certain details are intentionally omitted toimprove clarity of the description. The discussion of FIG. 1 will beorganized as follows. First, the elements of the figure will bedescribed, followed by their interconnections. Then, the use of theelements in the system will be described in greater detail.

FIG. 1 includes the system 100. The system 100 includes an organizationnetwork 110, a first cloud-based service 120, a second cloud-basedservice 122, an introspector 130, a metadata store 140, an analysis andsimulation engine 150, a visualization engine 160, an inline proxy 170,and a network(s) 180. The organization network 110 comprises a varietyof user endpoints such as computers 112 a-n, tablets 114 a-n, and cellphones 116 a-n.

The interconnection of the elements of system 100 will now be described.The network(s) 180, couples the computers 112 a-n, the tables 114 a-n,the cell phones 116 a-n, the first cloud-based service 120, the secondcloud-based service 122, the introspector 130, the metadata store 140,the analysis and simulation engine 150, the visualization engine 160,and the inline proxy 170, all in communication with each other(indicated by solid double-arrowed lines). The actual communication pathcan be point-to-point over public and/or private networks. Thecommunications can occur over a variety of networks, e.g., privatenetworks, VPN, MPLS circuit, or Internet, and can use appropriateapplication programming interfaces (APIs) and data interchange formats,e.g., Representational State Transfer (REST), JavaScript Object Notation(JSON), Extensible Markup Language (XML), Simple Object Access Protocol(SOAP), Java Message Service (JMS), and/or Java Platform Module System.All of the communications can be encrypted. The communication isgenerally over a network such as the LAN (local area network), WAN (widearea network), telephone network (Public Switched Telephone Network(PSTN), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), wireless network,point-to-point network, star network, token ring network, hub network,Internet, inclusive of the mobile Internet, via protocols such as EDGE,3G, 4G LTE, Wi-Fi and WiMAX. The engines or system components of FIG. 1are implemented by software running on varying types of computingdevices. Example devices are a workstation, a server, a computingcluster, a blade server, and a server farm. Additionally, a variety ofauthorization and authentication techniques, such as username/password,Open Authorization (OAuth), Kerberos, SecureID, digital certificates andmore, can be used to secure the communications.

In this application, a file refers to a unit of data maintained by acloud-based service. Examples of files include documents, messages, andsource code. A file has metadata obtained from file inspection thatidentifies attributes of the file. File metadata also identifies anaudit log of user interaction with a file. Examples of user interactioninclude sharing a file with other users, uploading a file to acloud-based service, and downloading a file from a cloud-based service.A file can be stored on cloud-based services using different storageschemes that encode the file into smaller or larger units. For instance,a file can be stored using block storage or object storage schemes wherethe file is broken into fixed-size blocks or objects for storage oncloud infrastructure. In this application, any encoding used by acloud-based service to store, represent, or reconstruct a file is alsoconsidered a file. In this application, the term “file(s)” and “fileobject(s)” are used interchangeably.

The organization's users use endpoints or devices like the computers 112a-n, the tablets 114 a-n, and the cell phones 116 a-n to store andcollaborate on files on cloud-based services like the first cloud-basedservice 120 and the second cloud-based service 122. Using the userendpoints, the organization's users interact with the cloud-basedservices and perform activities like file collaboration, contentmanagement, file sharing, and backup. For example, users create newfiles, edit already existing files, share files with other users insideor outside the organization, assign access privileges to files, and soon. Similar activities are also performed at the folder level. The usersshare files or folders across multiple cloud-based services. Forexample, a user can receive a file using a first cloud-based servicesuch as Box™ and share the same file to one or more users using a secondcloud-based service such as Salesforce.com™. The user can be member of afirst group of “n” users collaborating through the first cloud-based andalso a member of a second group of “m” users collaborating through thesecond cloud-based application at the same time. The file received bythe user from a first cloud-based service (such as Box™) can spread themalware to the first group of user “n” via sync and share mechanism ofthe first cloud-based service. If the user collaborates on the fileusing the second cloud-based service (Salesforce.com™), the malware canspread to the second group of users “m”.

In FIG. 1, two cloud-based services are shown, however, it is understoodthat system 100 can include any number of cloud-based services.Cloud-based services of system 100 can be hosted services, cloudapplications, cloud stores, cloud collaboration and messaging platforms,and/or cloud customer relationship management (CRM) platforms. They canbe a network service or application, or can be web-based (e.g., accessedvia a uniform resource locator (URL)) or native, such as sync clients.Examples include software-as-a-service (SaaS) offerings,platform-as-a-service (PaaS) offerings, and infrastructure-as-a-service(IaaS) offerings, as well as internal enterprise applications that areexposed via URLs. Examples of common cloud-based services today includeSalesforce.com™, Box™, Dropbox™, Google Apps™, Amazon AWS™ MicrosoftOffice365™, Workday™, Oracle on Demand™, Taleo™, Yammer™, Jive™, andConcur™.

Cloud-based services provide functionality to users that is implementedin the cloud and that is the target of policies, e.g., logging in,editing documents, and deleting documents, in contrast to the offeringsof a simple website and ecommerce sites. Note that some consumer facingwebsites, e.g., Facebook™ and Yammer™, which offer social networks arethe type of cloud-based services considered here. Also cloudcollaboration and messaging platforms like file sharing applicationssuch as Slack™, HipChat™, Confluence™, TeamDrive™, and Taskworld™ andcloud CRM applications like Chatter™, Zoho™, and ProsperWorks™ are thetype of cloud-based services considered here. Some cloud-based services,e.g., Google's Gmail™ offer hybrid options, with some free users andother organizational users enrolled via an enterprise subscription. Notethat implementations can support both web browser clients (e.g.,Dropbox™ website) and application clients (e.g., Dropbox™ client).Either forms can use URL-based APIs.

An API refers to a packaged collection of code libraries, routines,protocols methods, and fields that belong to a set of classes, includingits interface types. The API defines the way that developers andprogrammers can use the classes for their own software development, justby importing the relevant classes and writing statements thatinstantiate the classes and call their methods and fields. An API is asource code based specification intended to be used as an interface bysoftware components to communicate with each other. An API can includespecifications for routines, data structures, object classes, andvariables. Basically, an API provides an interface for developers andprogrammers to access the underlying data, platform capabilities, andfeatures of cloud-based services. Implementations of the technologydisclosed use different types of APIs, including web service APIs suchas HTTP or HTTPs based APIs like SOAP, Bulk, XML-RPC and JSON-RPC andREST APIs (e.g., Flickr™, Google Static Maps™ Google Geolocation™), websocket APIs, library-based APIs like JavaScript and TWAIN (e.g., GoogleMaps™ JavaScript API, Dropbox™ JavaScript Data store API, Twilio™ APIs,Oracle Call Interface (OCI)), class-based APIs like Java API and AndroidAPI (e.g., Google Maps™ Android API, MSDN Class Library for .NETFramework, Twilio™ APIs for Java and C#), OS functions and routines likeaccess to file system and access to user interface, object remoting APIslike CORBA and .NET Remoting, and hardware APIs like video acceleration,hard disk drives, and PCI buses. Other examples of APIs used by thetechnology disclosed include Amazon EC2 API™, Box Content API™,Microsoft Graph™, Dropbox API™, Dropbox API v2™, Dropbox Core API™,Dropbox Core API v2™, Facebook Graph API™, Foursquare API™, GeonamesAPI™, Force.com API™, Force.com Metadata API™, Apex API™, VisualforceAPI™, Force.com Enterprise WSDL™, Salesforce.com Streaming API™,Salesforce.com Tooling API™, Google Drive API™, Drive REST API™,AccuWeather API™, and aggregated-single API like CloudRail™ API.

Inline proxy 170 is interposed between the user endpoints and thecloud-based services. It uses a combination of deep API inspection(DAPII), deep packet inspection (DPI), and log inspection to monitorcloud traffic traversing the organization network 110 to and from thecloud-based services. The inline proxy 170 evaluates the applicationlayer traffic to discover cloud-based services interfacing with theorganization network 110. It then uses DAPII to detect cloudtransactions in real-time, including calls made to the cloud-basedservices. The cloud transactions are decomposed to identify the activitybeing performed and its associated parameters. In one implementation,the transactions are represented as JSON files, which identify astructure and format that allows the inline proxy 170 to both interpretwhat actions a user is performing in the cloud-based service as it ishappening. So, for example, the inline proxy 170 can detect for anorganization that “Joe from Investment Banking, currently in Japan,shared his M&A directory with an investor at a hedge fund at 10 PM”.

Inline proxy 170 also includes a data loss prevention (DLP) engine thatperforms different content inspection techniques on files en route toand from the cloud-based services. Examples of content inspectiontechniques used by the inline proxy 170 include language-aware dataidentifier application, document fingerprinting, file type detection,keyword search, pattern matching, proximity search, regular expressionlookup, exact data matching, metadata extraction, and language-agnosticdouble-byte character inspection.

Introspector 130 is not proxy driven, rather it interacts directly withthe cloud-based services for inspecting data at rest. In a polling mode,the introspector 130 calls the cloud-based services using API connectorsto crawl data resident in the cloud-based services and check forchanges. As an example, Box™ storage application provides an admin APIcalled the Box Content API™ that provides visibility into anorganization's accounts for all users. The introspector 130 polls thisAPI to discover any changes made to any of the accounts. If so, the BoxEvents API™ is polled to discover the detailed data changes.

In a callback model, the introspector 130 registers with the cloud-basedservices via API connectors to be informed of any significant events.For example, the introspector 130 can use Microsoft Office365 WebhooksAPI™ to learn when a file has been shared externally.

Introspector 130 also has deep API inspection (DAPII), deep packetinspection (DPI), and log inspection capabilities and includes a DLPengine that applies the different content inspection techniques on filesat rest in the cloud-based services.

The result of the inspection by the inline proxy 170 and theintrospector 130 is generation of user-by-user data and file-by-filedata. After being generated, the user-by-user data and the file-by-filedata is stored in the metadata store 140. In one implementation, theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data is stored in asemi-structured data format like JSON, BSON (Binary JSON), XML,Protobuf, Avro, or Thrift object, which comprises fields (or columns)and corresponding values of potentially different types like numbers,strings, arrays, and objects.

Metadata store 140 can be a schema-less or NoSQL store like ApacheCassandra™ Google's BigTable™, HBase™, Voldemort™, CouchDB™, MongoDB™,DocumentDB™ Redis™, Riak™, and Neo4j™. Or, it can be a SQL-basedrelational database like Microsoft SQL Server™, Oracle Database™,MySQL™, and IBM DB2™.

Some examples of the user-by-user data that are considered particularlymeaningful in evaluating user hygiene score and user collaborative riskscore can include information about an individual user such as theuser's identity, the user's biographic information (e.g., title orrole), an endpoint type used by the user, and the user's last logintimestamp. Some examples of the file-by-file data that are consideredparticularly meaningful in evaluating file object hygiene score and fileobject collaborative risk score include information about an individualfile such as user identifies of users that have access to the file(e.g., internal and external users), the nature of the access privilegesof respective users (e.g., read-only privileges and write privileges),whether the file contains sensitive data, and whether the file is in afolder that is synced with external users. Other examples of thefile-by-file data include a file identity, a name of the cloud-basedservice on which the file is stored or collaborated, the internetprotocol (IP) address from where a user accessed the file, an endpointlocation from where a user accessed the file, and user groups that haveaccess to the file.

User-by-user data and file-by-file data can identify activities likecreating a file, uploading a file, downloading a file, opening a file,editing a file, and sharing a file. User-by-user data and file-by-filedata can be used to establish a baseline usage behavior based oncriteria such as user, user groups, cloud-based service, cloud-basedservice categories, time of day, day of week, geolocation, bandwidthusage, and latency observed. The usage behaviors can be tracked per fileand/or across folders.

A sample of the user-by-user data and the file-by-file data according toone implementation includes the following:

-   -   Cloud-based service name    -   Cloud-based service category    -   Source IP        -   First 2 octets        -   First 3 octets        -   Full IP        -   Source location        -   Source country        -   Source zipcode        -   Source region    -   Destination IP        -   First 2 octets        -   First 3 octets        -   Full IP        -   Destination location        -   Destination country        -   Destination zipcode        -   Destination region        -   Destination host    -   User agent    -   Browser version    -   Operating System (OS) (e.g., Windows™, Android™, iOS™, Linux™)    -   Device Type (e.g., iPhone 6S™, Samsung Galaxy S5™, Nokia Lumia™)    -   Hour-of-Day    -   Part-of-Day    -   Day-of-Week    -   Type of activity (e.g., activity “File Upload”)    -   Object acted on (e.g., activity “Secrets.doc”)    -   Sensitivity level (e.g., sensitivity “High” based on designation        of confidential file assets by the tenant)    -   Degree of sharing (e.g., share-count: 3 based on number of        external parties with whom the file is shared (3))    -   User endpoint location    -   User endpoint vulnerability characteristics    -   User file sharing information    -   Identities of users sharing the file objects

FIGS. 3, 4, and 5 show various examples of user-by-user data andfile-by-file data regarding interaction of an organization's users withone or more cloud-based services. In FIG. 3, example entry 302identifies a file object using a file object identifier (“id”), exampleentry 304 identifies Dropbox™ as the cloud-based service on which thefile object is stored, example entry 306 identifies a user identifier(“User Id”) of a user who interacted with the file object, example entry308 identifies Rama Rao as the name of the user (“User Name”), exampleentry 310 identifies an IP addressed associated with a user endpointused by the user to interact with the file object (“urip”), exampleentry 312 identifies a .txt file type of the file object (“oid”),example entry 314 identifies the activity performed by the user as share(“act”), example entry 316 identifies an iOS operating system running onthe user endpoint (“os”), and example entry 318 identifies a sourcelocation of the user endpoint (“slc”). As shown in FIG. 3, theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data can include additionalentries as well.

In FIG. 4, log 402 contains user-by-user data and file-by-file data thatidentify user file sharing behavior. For example, the log 402 identifiesa file object (“id”), a cloud-based service on which the file objectresides (“appname”), a username of a user who interacted with the fileobject (“ghostking”), whether the user is an admin (“isAdmin”), when theuser last logged in (“lastLoginTime”), and a user identifier of the user(“uid”). As shown in the log 404, the user-by-user data and thefile-by-file data can identify additional user file sharing behavior. Insome implementations, logs 402 and 404 identify user file sharingbehavior of two users respectively.

In FIG. 5, logs 502, 504, 506, 508, and 510 contain user-by-user dataand file-by-file data that identify different key-value pairsrepresenting various user and file characteristics. In someimplementations, logs 502, 504, 506, 508, and 510 apply to five fileobjects respectively. The following sample includes some examplekey-value pairs identified by the user-by-user data and the file-by-filedata:

Value for Log 502 Value for Log 506 Key (e.g., first file object) (e.g.,third file object) File identifier (“_id”) 74114882302 11137246890Shared Type (“sharedType”) private external User Identifier (“user”)gbansal@netskope.com admin@nammazone.com Domain Name acme.com gmail.com(“domain_shared_with”) Type (“fileType”) document folder CollaborationStatus not collaborated collaborated (“collaborated”) Ownership Status(“ownership”) internally owned externally owned

In addition to periodically generating the user-by-user data and thefile-by-file data and persisting it in the metadata store 140, theinline proxy 170 and the introspector 130 also enforce security policieson the cloud traffic. The inline proxy 170 and the introspector 130further include a security engine that triggers various security actionsbased on the results of the DLP inspection. Examples of security actionsinclude quarantining high value file objects, encrypting high value fileobjects, and quarantining high value users. For further informationregarding the functionality of the inline proxy 170 and the introspector130, reference can be made to, for example, commonly owned U.S. patentapplication Ser. Nos. 14/198,499; 14/198,508; 14/835,640; 14/835,632;and 62/307,305; Cheng, Ithal, Narayanaswamy, and Malmskog. CloudSecurity For Dummies, Netskope Special Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.2015; “Netskope Introspection” by Netskope, Inc.; “Data Loss Preventionand Monitoring in the Cloud” by Netskope, Inc.; “Cloud Data LossPrevention Reference Architecture” by Netskope, Inc.; “The 5 Steps toCloud Confidence” by Netskope, Inc.; “The Netskope Reactive Platform” byNetskope, Inc.; “The Netskope Advantage: Three “Must-Have” Requirementsfor Cloud Access Security Brokers” by Netskope, Inc.; “The 15 CriticalCASB Use Cases” by Netskope, Inc.; “Netskope Reactive Cloud DLP” byNetskope, Inc.; “Repave the Cloud-Data Breach Collision Course” byNetskope, Inc.; and “Netskope Cloud Confidence Index™” by Netskope,Inc., which are incorporated by reference for all purposes as if fullyset forth herein.

The analysis and simulation engine 150 evaluates the user-by-user dataand the file-by-file data stored in the metadata store 140 andconstructs a directed graph. The directed graph has nodes that representan organization's users and has edges between the nodes that representfile-based connections between the users. For example, the directedgraph identifies a first user, i.e., a first node, connected via an edgeto a second user, i.e., a second node, if the first and second usersshare a file through a cloud-based service. Other examples of file-basedconnections include users sharing a folder with other users, userstransmitting a file to other users, and users transmitting a folder toother users.

Additionally, the analysis and simulation engine 150 traces connectionsamong the users by traversing the directed graph to calculate connecteduser-file depth and to partition users in the organization intounconnected user partitions. The users in one partition are eitherdirectly connected to each other through a shared file or indirectlyconnected by a chain of edges.

Overall, the directed graph identifies how the organization's users arecollaborating with others users on various cloud-based services;providing the organization with an evaluation of its so-called “cloudcollaborativeness” on a single pane of glass.

In some implementations, the directed graph includes only users internalto an organization. In other implementations, it also includes externalusers. In some implementations, the directed graph only includes fileobjects that are internally owned by an organization. In otherimplementations, it also includes file objects that are externallyowned.

The analysis and simulation engine 150 identifies an entry point userzero in the organization network 110 that has been infected by amalware. Malware refers to a machine-propagated or human-propagatedmalicious activity or infection that harms an organization's networkresources and infrastructure such as files, computers, servers, anddatabases. Examples of a malware include adware, spyware, virus, worm,trojan, rootkit, backdoor, keylogger, rouge security software,ransomware, and browser hijacker. Passive malware that holds files forransom is activated by executing an infected file. Passive spread alsoextends to reading files that have embedded scripts or macros, such asPDF or DOCM files, using viewers that execute the embedded code. Inparticular, implementations of the technology disclosed simulate andvisualize spread of ransomware in a cloud-based collaborationenvironment.

The entry point user zero is identified based on determining that amalicious activity is in process in the directed graph. In oneimplementation, such a determination is made by accessing the metadatastore 140 and analyzing current file-by-file data of file objects andhistorical file-by-file data of the file objects to identify a patternof changes from the historical data to the current data that exceeds apredetermined change velocity. For further information regardingdetecting a data attack like malware and ransomware that creates theentry point user zero in the organization network 110, reference can bemade to commonly owned U.S. Patent Application Nos. 62/373,288.

After one or more entry point users zero are identified, the analysisand simulation engine 150 traces connections among the users bytraversing the directed graph to simulate the spread of malware from theentry point users zero through the organization network 110. Inimplementations, the simulation is based on epidemiological models likeKermack and McKendrick compartmental models including SIR (susceptible,infected, removed) model, SAIR (susceptible, antidote, infected,removed) model, SAIC (susceptible, antidote, infected, contaminated)model, SI (susceptible, infected) model, SIS (susceptible, infected,susceptible) model, SAI (susceptible, antidote, infected) model, SLBS(susceptible, latent, breaking, susceptible) model, and SLBRS(susceptible, latent, breaking, recovered, susceptible) model.

The analysis and simulation engine 150 simulates both proactive andreactive malware spread. In proactive malware spread simulation, theanalysis and simulation engine 150 identifies how a potential malwarecan propagate through the directed graph or a portion of the directedgraph (e.g., a user partition or a section of a user partition) and canimpact the organization network 110 given certain entry point users zero(i. e., identifying which users and files are susceptible to infectionby the malware).

In one implementation of the proactive malware spread simulation, theentry point users zero are already infected users that have not yettransmitted the malware to other users or have transmitted the malwareonly to a limited number of other users. In another implementation ofthe proactive malware spread simulation, the entry point users zero areselected from a pool of uninfected users that are most likely candidatesfor malware infection based on the user-by-user data and thefile-by-file data. In yet another implementation, the entry point userszero are selected randomly from a pool of uninfected users. In yetfurther implementation, the entry point users zero are selected from apool of high value users or users that have file-based connections withhigh value file objects.

In reactive malware spread simulation, the analysis and simulationengine 150 identifies how a malware, starting from certain entry pointusers zero, has already propagated through the directed graph or aportion of the directed graph (e.g., a user partition or a section of auser partition) and impacted the organization network 110 (i. e.,identifying which users and files have been infected by the malware).The identification is stratified into classes such as users and filesthat have been exposed to the malware but have not been yet infected bythe malware, users and files that have been infected by the malware buthave not yet transmitted the malware to other users and files, and usersand files that have transmitted the malware to other users and files.

In implementations, the analysis and simulation engine 150 stores thedirected graph and the analysis and simulation of malware spread throughthe directed graph as simulation data in a simulation store 190.

The visualization engine 160 accesses the simulation store 190 and usesthe simulation data to produce a visualization of the spread from theentry point users zero, to users within a user partition to which theuser zeros belong, at varying transmission distances from the userszero. The varying transmission distances are determined from theconnected user-file depth.

FIG. 2 depicts different system sub-components 200 used by the systemcomponents shown in FIG. 1. Some implementations may have differentand/or additional modules than those shown in FIG. 2. Moreover, thefunctionalities can be distributed among the modules and across thehardware platforms in a different manner than described herein.

The introspector 130 comprises an administrative integrator 211, a querybuilder 213, and a metadata organizer 215. Administrative integrator 211has specific connectors for different cloud-based services that allowthe introspector 130 to inspect data at rest in the cloud-basedservices. For example, in FIG. 2, API connector 1 can be for Box™ andAPI connector 2 can be for Dropbox™. In other implementations, theadministrative integrator 211 includes a so-called “universal connector”that serves as a single interface to multiple cloud-based services, andin particular to unsanctioned cloud-based services. In implementations,the administrative integrator 211 uses secure protocols like OAuth toaccess the cloud-based services.

The query builder 213 is used to create custom queries that instruct theadministrative integrator 211 to collect specific user-by-user data andspecific file-by-file data from different cloud-based services. Thecustomization can be based on respective metrics used in the simulation.

The metadata organizer 215 maps the user-by-user data and thefile-by-file data from multiple cloud-based services into profiles thatare stored in the metadata store 140. Examples of profiles include userprofiles, file object profiles, partition profiles, organization groupprofiles, and organization profiles. Prior to profiling, in someimplementations, the user-by-user data and the file-by-file data issubjected to pre-processing such as deduplication and entity resolution.

The analysis and simulation engine 150 comprises a graph builder 231, agraph traverser 233, a metrics calculator 235, an infection propagator237, an iterator 239. The graph builder 231 uses the user-by-user dataand the file-by-file data to build a graph that connects the usersthrough shared file objects. In the graph, the users are represented asnodes and the shared file objects are represented as edges. In oneimplementation, the connections are represented by a directed cyclicgraph and the nodes are connected by directed edges. If two users sharea file object on a cloud-based service and both have a write privilegeon the file object, they are connected by a bidirectional edge. In thiscase, both users are equally at risk of spreading the malware throughthe shared file object because the shared file object gets synced to thecloud-based service from endpoints of both the users. Thus, irrespectiveof at which user's endpoint the shared file object gets infected, theinfection is transmitted to the cloud-based service and in turn to theendpoint of the other user.

If a first user shares a file object with a second user on a cloud-basedservice by giving read-only privilege to the second user, then the firstand second users are connected by a unidirectional edge, with the edgepointing towards the second user. In this case, the second user issusceptible to malware infection by the first user as a result ofreceiving and/or opening the shared file object that is infected andsynced to the cloud-based service from an endpoint of the first user. Incontrast, the first user is not susceptible to malware infection by thesecond user because the shared file object does not get synced to thecloud-based service from an endpoint of the second user. Thus, even if alocal instance of the shared file object is infected at the seconduser's endpoint, the infection is not transmitted to the cloud-basedservice and in turn not transmitted to the first user's endpoint.

Additionally, the graph builder 231 uses the user-by-user and thefile-by-file data to calculate connected user-file depth, whichidentifies all or some of the user-file connections in the organization,including the longest user-file connection. In one implementation, whenthe connected user-file depth represents the longest user-fileconnection in the organization, it is inserted to determine an amount oftime it will take for the malware spread to completely propagate throughthe directed graph and thus infect every user and file object in theorganization network 110.

The graph traverser 233 traverses the graph built by the graph builder231. Graph traversal or graph search refers to the process of visitingeach node in the graph. Unlike tree traversals, graph traversals mayrequire visiting some nodes more than once because it is not necessarilyknown before traversing a node that it has already been explored. Asgraphs become more dense, this redundancy becomes more prevalent causingcomputation time to increase. The complexity of graph traversal furtherincreases for directed cyclic graphs because of the presence of cycles.To reduce the complexity, in some implementations, the graph traverser233 converts the directed cyclic graph generated by the graph builder231 to an undirected graph.

The graph traverser 233 also identifies groups of user endpoints inunconnected partitions of the graph. In some implementations, users in afirst partition of the graph are not at risk of getting infected bymalware from file objects shared by users in a second partition. Someexamples of graph traversal algorithms used by the graph traverser 233include breadth-first search (BFS) algorithm, depth-first search (DFS)algorithm, random walk algorithm, anti-random walk algorithm, recursivegreedy algorithm, topological sort algorithm, and strongly connectedcomponents algorithm. In another implementation, Markov chain algorithmis used by the graph traverser 233 for graph traversal.

The metrics calculator 235 calculates collaborative risk scores (CRSs)or collaborative risk indexes (CRIs) and hygiene scores at varyinglevels of granularity in the organization network 110. The CRS value foran individual user is a weighted combination of a user rate ofcollaboration of the user, a hygiene score of a location of a userendpoint of the user, and vulnerability characteristics of the userendpoint, and a hygiene score of the user. The user rate ofcollaboration depends on the number of shared files a user is workingon. The collaboration rate further depends on the access privilegesapplicable to the shared files. If the user has write privileges over ashared file object, it increases the risk of malware spread as comparedto read-only privileges. A hygiene score is assigned to the locationbased on historical data. For example if the user is in a location fromwhere malware infected documents have regularly originated, such alocation is given a low hygiene score. The vulnerability characteristicsof the user endpoint are determined by the operating system andapplications and services running on the user endpoint. For example, ifthe endpoint does not have the most recent version of the operatingsystem, the endpoint is assigned a low hygiene score. The user hygienescore is calculated based on historical data such as previous malwaredetections and results from user-level security evaluations.

A file object hygiene score is calculated based on the sharinginformation about the file object. For example, if the file object isshared internally, it is assigned a high hygiene score. If the fileobject is shared externally, it is assigned a low hygiene score. Thedegree to which a file is shared internally or externally also impactsthe file object hygiene score. The file object hygiene can be furtherrefined based on analysis of file object write privileges and sharingamongst internal or external groups.

The metrics calculator 235 also calculates a CRS score for a partition(a group of connected users) by aggregating the individual CRS scoresfor the users in the partition. An organization CRS is calculated byaggregating the scores of all users and/or user partitions in theorganization.

The metrics calculator 235 calculates an external surface exposure valuefor a file object based on the identities of the external users sharingthe file object. The external users do not belong to the organizationbut they are given access to a shared file object by a user belonging tothe organization. The access privilege can be a file object writeprivilege or a read-only privilege. The metrics calculator 235aggregates the external surface exposure for all file objects shared toexternal users to determine external surface exposure for theorganization. An external surface exposure score for a folder object isalso calculated if the folder object is shared with the external user.The folder object contains one or more file objects. In thisapplication, certain concepts are claimed and explained in the contextof “file objects” or “files”. These concepts apply equally to “folderobjects” or “folders”.

It is understood that a variety of scoring schemes can be used torepresent the various hygiene scores, CRSs, and external surfaceexposure scores described above. For example, a hygiene score can berepresented by using discrete values or a Likert scale.

The infection propagator 237 uses the uses the user-by-user and thefile-by-file data, the different metrics, and the directed graph toidentify the impact of malware spread through the organization's network110. It is applied in both a proactive and a reactive scenario. In theproactive scenario, the infection propagator 237 is used to perform awhat-if analysis. Malware impact analysis visualization is generated byinitiating malware spread from one or more user endpoints. The userendpoint initiating the malware spread is also referred to as a patientzero. The proactive analysis can be performed by selectively choosinguser endpoints as patient zero based on a pre-defined criteria, orsystematically choosing all user endpoints. In a reactive scenario, theinfection propagation is used to generate the impact analysis byinitiating malware spread through the organization's network 110 fromone or more user endpoints that are actually infected by a malware. Thisallows the organization to perform preventive measures to protectvaluable documents and valuable users before they are impacted. Anexample infection propagation analysis is shown in FIGS. 7A through 7F.

A probability distribution of events can be used to generate thesimulation of malware spread through the organization's network 110. Anexample of the event is a user opening a shared file. A number ofprobability distributions are available for simulation purposes such asnormal, lognormal, uniform, and triangular. Each user in theorganization can also be assigned a discrete value for an event based onthe historical data. For example, a first user can have 20% chance ofopening a shared file object and a second user can have 80% chance ofopening a shared file object. These values can be further refined basedon other factors. For example, if two users work on the same project,there is a high probability of them opening a shared file object.

The analysis and simulation engine 150 executes the infectionpropagation simulation using a simulation model. An example simulationmodel is the Monte Carlo simulation model. Monte Carlo simulationprovides the decision maker with a range of possible outcomes and theprobabilities of their occurrence. During Monte Carlo simulation, valuesare sampled at random from the input probability distributions. Each setof samples is called an iteration and the resulting outcome from thatsample is recorded. Monte Carlo simulation does this for hundreds andthousands of times and the result is a probability distribution ofpossible outcomes. In this way, the decision maker has a morecomprehensive view of what may happen because the results not only showwhat may happen but how likely it is to happen. The iterator 239generates these results for the organization's decision maker using theselected probability distribution for inputs and the simulation model.

The visualization engine 160 contains a graph database 251 containing amultiplicity of graph layouts 253. A layout of a graph is a pictorialrepresentation of the nodes and the edges of the graph. A graph can berepresented by multiple graph layouts. The arrangement of the verticesand the edges with the graph layout affects its understandability andusability. Some examples of graph layouts 253 include Kamada-Kawai,Fruchterman-Reingold, Reingold-Tilford, GEM, and Tunkelang.Modifications of the existing graphs layouts can also be used torepresent the visualization of the spread of malware across theorganization's network 110.

Visualization

FIG. 6 is a visualization based on a directed graph constructed from theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data regarding interaction of anorganization's users with one or more cloud-based services. A blackcircle on the graphic visualization 600 represents a user and a bluecircle represents a file object. The users are connected to each otherthrough shared files, which are represented by the edges. A boundary 602encloses a connected partition of the users. An entry point user zero604 is also shown.

FIGS. 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E, and 7F are an example time-lapsedvisualization of the malware spread simulation through an organizationof users who store files on one or more cloud-based storage services.FIG. 7A shows three users 702, 704, and 706 with user endpoints infectedwith a malware. FIG. 7B shows the spread of malware to a user 708through a file shared with the user 702. Likewise, FIG. 7B shows spreadof the malware to a user 710 who is sharing a file with the user 708.This process continues to infect the user 712. A user 718 gets malwarefrom user 704.

FIG. 7C shows further spread of the malware across the organizationsnetwork 110 impacting users 716, 718, 720, 722, 727, 726, 728, and 730.In FIG. 7D, the malware further propagates to new users as shown by morered colored nodes. FIGS. 7E and 7F show further progression of themalware resulting in impacting all the users in a connected partition,as graphically depicted by red colored nodes in FIG. 7F.

Process

FIG. 8 is a representative flowchart 800 that illustrates a method ofsimulation and visualization of malware spread in a cloud-basedcollaboration environment. Flowchart 800 can be implemented at leastpartially with a computer or other data processing system, e.g., by oneor more processors configured to receive or retrieve information,process the information, store results, and transmit the results. Otherimplementations may perform the actions in different orders and/or withdifferent, fewer or additional actions than those illustrated in FIG. 8.Multiple actions can be combined in some implementations. Forconvenience, this flowchart is described with reference to the systemthat carries out a method. The system is not necessarily part of themethod.

At action 810, user-by-user data and file-by-file data regarding theusers' interaction with the cloud-based services is collected. Forindividual users, the user-by-user data includes user endpoint location,user endpoint vulnerability characteristics, and user file sharinginformation. For individual file objects, the file-by-file data includesidentities of users sharing the file objects and user access privilegeinformation. In some implementations, the user-by-user data andfile-by-file data is collected via a cross-application introspector withone or more API connectors to the cloud-based services. In otherimplementations, the user-by-user data and file-by-file data iscollected via a cross-application proxy, interposed between userendpoints and the cloud-based services, which inspects the users'interaction with the cloud-based services in real-time.

At action 820, connections among the users in the organization aretraced by traversing a directed graph constructed from the user-by-userdata and the file-by-file data. Based on the directed graph, a connecteduser-file depth is calculated. The directed graph is also used topartition users in the organization into unconnected user partitions.

At action 830, the directed graph is used to simulate the spread ofmalware. The simulation simulates the malware spread from an entry pointuser zero through the organization, via the cloud-based services. Thesimulation simulates user exposure to, infection by, and transmission ofthe malware within the organization.

At action 840, a visualization of the malware spread is produced. Thevisualization graphically depicts the malware spread from the entrypoint user zero, to users within a user partition to which the user zerobelongs, at varying transmission distances from the user zero. Thevarying transmission distances are determined from the connecteduser-file depth.

Computer System

FIG. 9 is a simplified block diagram of a computer system that can beused to implement the technology disclosed. Computer system 900typically includes one or more CPU processors 920 that communicate witha number of peripheral devices via bus subsystem 932. These peripheraldevices can include a memory subsystem 912 including, for example,memory devices and a file storage subsystem 918, user interface inputdevices 930, user interface output devices 924, a network interfacesubsystem 922, and a GPU 926 with multiple GPU processing cores or GPUprocessors 928. The input and output devices allow user interaction withcomputer system 900. Network interface subsystem 922 provides aninterface to outside networks, including an interface to correspondinginterface devices in other computer systems.

The visualization engine 160 and the analysis and simulation engine 150are connected to the storage subsystem 910 and the GPU 926.

User interface input devices 930 or clients or client devices caninclude a keyboard; pointing devices such as a mouse, trackball,touchpad, or graphics tablet; a scanner; a touch screen incorporatedinto the display; audio input devices such as voice recognition systemsand microphones; and other types of input devices. In general, use ofthe term “input device” is intended to include all possible types ofdevices and ways to input information into computer system 900.

User interface output devices 924 can include a display subsystem, aprinter, a fax machine, or non-visual displays such as audio outputdevices. The display subsystem can include a cathode ray tube (CRT), aflat-panel device such as a liquid crystal display (LCD), a projectiondevice, or some other mechanism for creating a visible image. Thedisplay subsystem can also provide a non-visual display such as audiooutput devices. In general, use of the term “output device” is intendedto include all possible types of devices and ways to output informationfrom computer system 900 to the user or to another machine or computersystem.

Storage subsystem 910 stores programming and data constructs thatprovide the functionality of some or all of the modules and methodsdescribed herein. These software modules are generally executed by CPUprocessors 920 alone or in combination with other processors like GPUprocessors 928.

Memory subsystem 912 in the storage subsystem can include a number ofmemories including a main random access memory (RAM) 916 for storage ofinstructions and data during program execution and a read only memory(ROM) 914 in which fixed instructions are stored. A file storagesubsystem 918 can provide persistent storage for program and data files,and can include a hard disk drive, a floppy disk drive along withassociated removable media, a CD-ROM drive, an optical drive, orremovable media cartridges. The modules implementing the functionalityof certain implementations can be stored by file storage subsystem 918or the memory subsystem 912, or in other machines accessible by theprocessor.

Bus subsystem 932 provides a mechanism for letting the variouscomponents and subsystems of computer system 900 communicate with eachother as intended. Although bus subsystem 932 is shown schematically asa single bus, alternative implementations of the bus subsystem can usemultiple busses. In some implementations, an application server (notshown) can be a framework that allows the applications of computersystem 900 to run, such as the hardware and/or software, e.g., theoperating system.

Computer system 900 itself can be of varying types including a personalcomputer, a portable computer, a workstation, a computer terminal, anetwork computer, a television, a mainframe, a server farm, awidely-distributed set of loosely networked computers, or any other dataprocessing system or user device. Due to the ever-changing nature ofcomputers and networks, the description of computer system 900 depictedin FIG. 9 is intended only as a specific example for purposes ofillustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention. Manyother configurations of computer system 900 are possible having more orless components than the computer system depicted in FIG. 9.

Particular Implementations

We describe various implementations of simulating and visualizing spreadof malware in a cloud-based collaboration environment. In thisapplication, certain implementations are claimed and explained in thecontext of “file objects” or “files”. These concepts apply equally to“folder objects” or “folders”.

The technology disclosed can be practiced as a system, method, device,product, computer readable media, or article of manufacture. One or morefeatures of an implementation can be combined with the baseimplementation. Implementations that are not mutually exclusive aretaught to be combinable. One or more features of an implementation canbe combined with other implementations. This disclosure periodicallyreminds the user of these options. Omission from some implementations ofrecitations that repeat these options should not be taken as limitingthe combinations taught in the preceding sections—these recitations arehereby incorporated forward by reference into each of the followingimplementations.

A system implementation of the technology disclosed includes one or moreprocessors coupled to memory. The memory is loaded with computerinstructions to analyze or simulate spread of malware through anorganization of users who store and collaborate on files on one or morecloud-based services. First, user-by-user data and file-by-file dataregarding the users' interaction with the cloud-based services iscollected. For individual users, the user-by-user data includes userendpoint location, user endpoint vulnerability characteristics, and userfile sharing information. For individual file objects, the file-by-filedata includes identities of users sharing the file objects and useraccess privilege information.

The user-by-user data and file-by-file data is collected via across-application introspector with one or more API connectors to thecloud-based services. In other implementations, the user-by-user dataand file-by-file data is collected via a cross-application proxy,interposed between user endpoints and the cloud-based services, whichinspects the users' interaction with the cloud-based services inreal-time.

Following this, connections among the users in the organization aretraced by traversing a directed graph constructed from the user-by-userdata and the file-by-file data. Based on the directed graph, a connecteduser-file depth is calculated. The directed graph is also used topartition users in the organization into unconnected user partitions.

The directed graph is used to simulate the spread of malware. Thesimulation simulates the malware spread from an entry point user zerothrough the organization, via the cloud-based services. The simulationsimulates user exposure to, infection by, and transmission of themalware within the organization.

A visualization of the malware spread is produced. The visualizationgraphically depicts the malware spread from the entry point user zero,to users within a user partition to which the user zero belongs, atvarying transmission distances from the user zero. The varyingtransmission distances are determined from the connected user-filedepth.

This system implementation and other systems disclosed optionallyinclude one or more of the following features. System can also includefeatures described in connection with methods disclosed. In the interestof conciseness, alternative combinations of system features are notindividually enumerated. Features applicable to systems, methods, andarticles of manufacture are not repeated for each statutory class set ofbase features. The reader will understand how features identified inthis section can readily be combined with base features in otherstatutory classes.

The user file sharing information can be used by the system to calculateuser rate of sharing files through the cloud-based services and userrate of opening files shared through the cloud-based services. Based onthis, for individual users, a user rate of collaboration is calculated.The user rate of collaboration can be in turn used for simulating thespread of malware.

The number of users with write access privileges to the file object andthe number of users with read access privileges to the file object canbe determined using the identities of the users sharing the file objectand the user access privilege information. Based on this, for individualfile objects, a file object collaboration depth is calculated. The fileobject collaboration depth can be in turn used for simulating the spreadof malware.

The identities of users sharing the file objects and the user accessprivilege information can be used to determine number of users in theorganization having access to a file object, number of users outside theorganization having access to the file object, and whether the fileobject is shared within an organizational group. Based on this, forindividual file objects, a hygiene score is calculated. The hygienescore can be in turn used for simulating the spread of malware.

A user collaborative risk score can be calculated for individual usersbased on the user endpoint location of a user, the user endpointvulnerability characteristics of the user, the user rate ofcollaboration of the user, the file object collaboration depth of fileobjects connected to the user, and the hygiene score of file objectsconnected to the user. The user collaborative risk score can be in turnused for simulating the spread of malware.

For individual file objects and file object folders connected to theusers in the organization, the identities of users sharing the fileobjects and the user access privilege information can be used todetermine number of users outside the organization with file objectwrite privileges and number of users outside the organization with fileobject folder write privileges. Based on this, an external surfaceexposure for the organization is calculated. The external surfaceexposure can be in turn used for simulating the spread of malware.

An organization collaborative risk score can be calculated for theorganization based on the external surface exposure of the organization,user collaborative risk scores of the users in the organization,occurrence recency and severity of a latest spread of malware, number ofmanaged and unmanaged devices in an organization network, and securitypatch level configured on organization devices. The organizationcollaborative risk score can be in turn used for simulating the spreadof malware.

A user partition hygiene score can be calculated for a user partitionbased on user collaborative risk scores of the users in the userpartition. The user partition hygiene score can be in turn used forsimulating the spread of malware.

The visualization graphically depicts the users and the file objects,connections between the users and the file objects, connections betweenthe file objects, and the user partitions and boundaries delineating theuser partitions.

The visualization graphically depicts hygiene scores of the fileobjects, user collaborative risk scores of the users, user partitionhygiene scores, and the organization collaborative risk score.

The visualization further includes using visual codings to distinguishbetween users based on malware exposure, malware infection, and malwaretransmission. It also includes adjusting the visual codings to provide atime-lapsed visualization of spread of the malware and evolution of someusers from malware exposure to malware infection to malwaretransmission.

This can be in turn used to replay the time-lapsed visualization.

The simulation can be iterated for a multiplicity of users beingrespective entry point users zero. Also, a visualization can be producedfor each iteration.

The spread of malware can be simulated from multiple entry point userszero. Also, a visualization can be produced that graphically depicts themultiple entry point users zero. In some implementations, the multipleentry point users zero are co-detected within a time window. In otherimplementations, the multiple entry point users zero are co-infected bya common source. In such implementations, a visualization can beproduced that graphically depicts the multiple entry point users zero asa single threat. In yet other implementations, the multiple entry pointusers zero are infected by different sources.

A prioritization scheme can be applied that prioritizes exposed orinfected filed objects and exposed or infected users based on theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data. The prioritization includesidentifying high value file objects that are exposed or infected basedon content inspection of the file objects by a data loss or leakprevention (DLP) engine and identifying high value users that areexposed or infected at least based on one of biographic information ofthe high value users and their connections with the high value fileobjects. Also, a visualization of the prioritization can be produced onat least one of a file-by-file basis and a user-by-user basis.

Furthermore, one or more security actions are executed in response toidentifying the high value file objects and the high value users. In oneimplementation, a security action can be quarantining the high valuefile objects. In another implementation, a security action can beencrypting the high value file objects. In yet another implementation,security action can be quarantining the high value users.

The simulation and the visualization can be periodically updated toreflect changes to the user-by-user data and file-by-file data.

The introspector inspects an e-mail of a user and detects a link thatshares a file object with one or more external users contained in thee-mail. In response to the detection, the introspector executes asecurity action. In other implementations, the introspector inspects amessage feed of a user and detects a link that shares a file object withone or more external users contained in a message of the message feed.In response to the detection, the introspector executes a securityaction.

The user endpoint vulnerability characteristics specify an operatingsystem running on the user endpoint, whether an endpoint routing clientis configured on the user endpoint, thereby identifying whether the userendpoint is managed or unmanaged, and a device type of the userendpoint.

The simulation and visualization of the spread of malware can be basedon an epidemiological model. Some examples include Kermack andMcKendrick compartmental models including SIR (susceptible, infected,removed) model, SAIR (susceptible, antidote, infected, removed) model,SAIC (susceptible, antidote, infected, contaminated) model, SI(susceptible, infected) model, SIS (susceptible, infected, susceptible)model, SAI (susceptible, antidote, infected) model, SLBS (susceptible,latent, breaking, susceptible) model, and SLBRS (susceptible, latent,breaking, recovered, susceptible) model.

The user-by-user data and file-by-file data can be encoded as parametersof the epidemiological model. In one implementation, the user endpointlocation can be encoded as at least one of an exposure parameter,environment hostility parameter, entry point parameter, and patient zeroparameter. In another implementation, the user endpoint vulnerabilitycharacteristics can be encoded as at least one of infection parameters,environment hardening parameters, and spread rate parameters. In yetanother implementation, the user collaborative risk score can be encodedas at least one of exposure parameter, entry point parameter, patientzero parameter, and infection parameter. In yet another implementation,the file object hygiene score can be encoded as at least one of exposureparameter, entry point parameter, patient zero parameter, and infectionparameter. In yet further implementation, the external exposure surfacecan be encoded as an infection parameter. In yet further implementation,the user partition hygiene score can be encoded as at least one ofexposure parameter, entry point parameter, infection parameter, andspread rate parameter, In yet further implementation, the user rate ofcollaboration can be encoded as a spread rate parameter. In yet furtherimplementation, the file object collaboration depth can be encoded as aspread rate parameter. In yet further implementation, the organizationcollaborative risk score can be encoded as a spread rate parameter. Inyet further implementation, the connected user-file depth can be encodedas at least one of spread rate parameter and time for spread to completeparameter.

A rate of spread can be calculated based on the encoding describedabove. Also, a visualization of the rate of spread can be produced.

The visualization can be based on one or more graph layouts. Someexamples of graph layouts include Kamada-Kawai, Fruchterman-Reingold,Reingold-Tilford, GEM, and Tunkelang. In one implementation, thevisualization can generate a single pane of glass animation of theorganization's cloud collaborativeness across the cloud-based services.

The malware spread can be initiated by ransomware. In otherimplementations, the malware spread can be initiated by human activity.

All the features and implementations disclosed herein for the “fileobjects” or “files” apply equally to “folder objects” or “folders”.

Other implementations may include a non-transitory computer readablestorage medium storing instructions executable by a processor to performfunctions of the system described above. Yet another implementation mayinclude a method performing the functions of the system described above.

A method implementation of the technology disclosed includes analyzingor simulating spread of malware through an organization of users whostore and collaborate on files on one or more cloud-based services. Themethod includes collecting user-by-user data and file-by-file dataregarding the users' interaction with the cloud-based services. Forindividual users, the user-by-user data includes user endpoint location,user endpoint vulnerability characteristics, and user file sharinginformation. For individual file objects, the file-by-file data includesidentities of users sharing the file objects and user access privilegeinformation.

The user-by-user data and file-by-file data is collected via across-application introspector with one or more API connectors to thecloud-based services. In other implementations, the user-by-user dataand file-by-file data is collected via a cross-application proxy,interposed between user endpoints and the cloud-based services, whichinspects the users' interaction with the cloud-based services inreal-time.

Following this, the method proceeds to tracing connections among theusers in the organization by traversing a directed graph constructedfrom the user-by-user data and the file-by-file data. Based on thedirected graph, a connected user-file depth is calculated. The directedgraph is also used to partition users in the organization intounconnected user partitions.

The method proceeds to simulating the spread of malware based on thedirected graph. The simulation simulates the malware spread from anentry point user zero through the organization, via the cloud-basedservices. The simulation simulates user exposure to, infection by, andtransmission of the malware within the organization.

The method concludes by producing a visualization of the malware spread.The visualization graphically depicts the malware spread from the entrypoint user zero, to users within a user partition to which the user zerobelongs, at varying transmission distances from the user zero. Thevarying transmission distances are determined from the connecteduser-file depth.

Each of the features discussed in this particular implementation sectionfor the system implementation apply equally to this methodimplementation. As indicated above, all the system features are notrepeated here and should be considered repeated by reference.

All the features and implementations disclosed herein for the “fileobjects” or “files” apply equally to “folder objects” or “folders”.

A computer readable media (CRM) implementation includes a non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium storing instructions executable by aprocessor to perform a method as described above. Another CRMimplementation may include a system including memory and one or moreprocessors operable to execute instructions, stored in the memory, toperform a method as described above.

In another CRM implementation, the technology disclosed includes anon-transitory computer readable storage medium impressed with computerprogram instructions to analyze or simulate spread of malware through anorganization of users who store and collaborate on files on one or morecloud-based services. The instructions, when executed on a processor,implement the method described above.

Each of the features discussed in this particular implementation sectionfor the system implementation apply equally to this CRM implementation.As indicated above, all the system features are not repeated here andshould be considered repeated by reference.

All the features and implementations disclosed herein for the “fileobjects” or “files” apply equally to “folder objects” or “folders”.

A system implementation of the technology disclosed at the level offolder objects includes one or more processors coupled to memory. Thememory is loaded with computer instructions to analyze or simulatespread of malware through an organization of users who store andcollaborate on folders on one or more cloud-based services. First,user-by-user data and folder-by-folder data regarding the users'interaction with the cloud-based services is collected. For individualusers, the user-by-user data includes user endpoint location, userendpoint vulnerability characteristics, and user folder sharinginformation. For individual folder objects, the folder-by-folder dataincludes identities of users sharing the folder objects and user accessprivilege information.

The user-by-user data and folder-by-folder data is collected via across-application introspector with one or more API connectors to thecloud-based services. In other implementations, the user-by-user dataand folder-by-folder data is collected via a cross-application proxy,interposed between user endpoints and the cloud-based services, whichinspects the users' interaction with the cloud-based services inreal-time.

Following this, connections among the users in the organization aretraced by traversing a directed graph constructed from the user-by-userdata and the folder-by-folder data. Based on the directed graph, aconnected user-folder depth is calculated. The directed graph is alsoused to partition users in the organization into unconnected userpartitions.

The directed graph is used to simulate the spread of malware. Thesimulation simulates the malware spread from an entry point user zerothrough the organization, via the cloud-based services. The simulationsimulates user exposure to, infection by, and transmission of themalware within the organization.

A visualization of the malware spread is produced. The visualizationgraphically depicts the malware spread from the entry point user zero,to users within a user partition to which the user zero belongs, atvarying transmission distances from the user zero. The varyingtransmission distances are determined from the connected user-folderdepth.

Any data structures and code described or referenced above are storedaccording to many implementations on a computer-readable storage medium,which may be any device or medium that can store code and/or data foruse by a computer system. This includes, but is not limited to, volatilememory, non-volatile memory, application-specific integrated circuits(ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), magnetic and opticalstorage devices such as disk drives, magnetic tape, CDs (compact discs),DVDs (digital versatile discs or digital video discs), or other mediacapable of storing computer-readable media now known or later developed.

The preceding description is presented to enable the making and use ofthe technology disclosed. Various modifications to the disclosedimplementations will be apparent, and the general principles definedherein may be applied to other implementations and applications withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope of the technology disclosed. Thus,the technology disclosed is not intended to be limited to theimplementations shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistentwith the principles and features disclosed herein. The scope of thetechnology disclosed is defined by the appended claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of simulating spread of malware throughan organization of users who store and collaborate on files on one ormore cloud-based services, the method including: collecting user-by-userdata and file-by-file data regarding the users' interaction with thecloud-based services, including: for individual users, collecting userendpoint location, user endpoint vulnerability characteristics, and userfile sharing information; for individual file objects, collectingidentities of users sharing the file objects, and user access privilegeinformation; tracing connections among the users in the organization bytraversing a directed graph constructed from the user-by-user data andthe file-by-file data to calculate connected user-file depth and topartition users in the organization into unconnected user partitions;simulating the spread of malware, from an entry point user zero throughthe organization, via the cloud-based services, using the directed graphto simulate user exposure to, infection by, and transmission of themalware within the organization; and producing a visualization of thespread from the entry point user zero, to users within a user partitionto which the user zero belongs, at varying transmission distances fromthe user zero determined from the connected user-file depth.
 2. Themethod of claim 1, further including: using the user file sharinginformation to calculate, for individual users: user rate of sharingfiles through the cloud-based services; and user rate of opening filesshared through the cloud-based services; calculating a user rate ofcollaboration based on the user rate of sharing files and the user rateof opening files; and using the user rate of collaboration forsimulating the spread of malware.
 3. The method of claim 1, furtherincluding: using the identities of users sharing the file objects andthe user access privilege information to determine, for individual fileobjects: number of users with file object write privileges; and numberof users with file object read privileges; calculating a file objectcollaboration depth based on the number of users with file object writeprivileges and the number of users with file object read privileges; andusing the file object collaboration depth for simulating the spread ofmalware.
 4. The method of claim 1, further including: using theidentities of users sharing the file objects and the user accessprivilege information to determine, for individual file objects: numberof users in the organization having access to a file object; number ofusers outside the organization having access to the file object; andwhether the file object is shared within an organizational group;calculating a hygiene score for the file object based on the number ofusers in the organization having access to the file object, the numberof users outside the organization having access to the file object, andwhether the file object is shared within an organizational group; andusing the hygiene score for simulating the spread of malware.
 5. Themethod of claim 3, further including, for individual users: calculatinga user collaborative risk score based on the user endpoint location of auser, the user endpoint vulnerability characteristics of the user, theuser rate of collaboration of the user, the file object collaborationdepth of file objects connected to the user, and the hygiene score offile objects connected to the user; and using the user collaborativerisk score for simulating the spread of malware.
 6. The method of claim1, further including: using the identities of users sharing the fileobjects and the user access privilege information to determine, forindividual file objects and file object folders connected to the usersin the organization: number of users outside the organization with fileobject write privileges; and number of users outside the organizationwith file object folder write privileges; calculating an externalsurface exposure for the organization based on the number of usersoutside the organization with file object write privileges and thenumber of users outside the organization with file object folder writeprivileges; and using the external surface exposure for simulating thespread of malware.
 7. The method of claim 6, further including, for theorganization: calculating an organization collaborative risk score basedon the external surface exposure of the organization, user collaborativerisk scores of the users in the organization, occurrence recency andseverity of a latest spread of malware, number of managed and unmanageddevices in an organization network, and security patch level configuredon organization devices; and using the organization collaborative riskscore for simulating the spread of malware.
 8. The method of claim 5,further including, for a user partition: calculating a user partitionhygiene score based on user collaborative risk scores of the users inthe user partition; and using the user partition hygiene score forsimulating the spread of malware.
 9. The method of claim 1, furtherincluding: iterating the simulating for a multiplicity of users as theentry point user zero; and producing a visualization for each iteration.10. The method of claim 1, further including: prioritizing exposed orinfected filed objects and exposed or infected users based on theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data, including: identifying highvalue file objects that are exposed or infected based on contentinspection of the file objects by a data loss or leak prevention (DLP)engine; and identifying high value users that are exposed or infected atleast based on one of biographic information of the high value users andtheir connections with the high value file objects; and producing avisualization of the prioritizing on at least one of a file-by-filebasis and a user-by-user basis.
 11. The method of claim 10, furtherincluding: executing one or more security actions in response toidentifying the high value file objects and the high value users. 12.The method of claim 1, further including: periodically updating thesimulating and the visualization to reflect changes to the user-by-userdata and the file-by-file data.
 13. The method of claim 1, wherein theuser-by-user data and the file-by-file data is collected via across-application introspector with one or more application programminginterface (API) connectors to the cloud-based services.
 14. The methodof claim 1, wherein the user-by-user data and the file-by-file data iscollected via a cross-application proxy, interposed between userendpoints and the cloud-based services, which inspects the users'interaction with the cloud-based services in real-time.
 15. The methodof claim 1, wherein the user endpoint vulnerability characteristicsspecify: an operating system running on the user endpoint, whether anendpoint routing client is configured on the user endpoint, therebyidentifying whether the user endpoint is managed or unmanaged, and adevice type of the user endpoint.
 16. The method of claim 1, wherein thesimulating the spread of malware is based on an epidemiological model.17. The method of claim 1, wherein the visualization is based on one ormore graph layouts.
 18. The method of claim 1, wherein the malwarespread is initiated by ransomware.
 19. A system including one or moreprocessors coupled to memory, the memory loaded with computerinstructions to simulate spread of malware through an organization ofusers who store and collaborate on files on one or more cloud-basedservices, the instructions, when executed on the processors, implementactions comprising: collecting user-by-user data and file-by-file dataregarding the users' interaction with the cloud-based services,including: for individual users, collecting user endpoint location, userendpoint vulnerability characteristics, and user file sharinginformation; for individual file objects, collecting identities of userssharing the file objects, and user access privilege information; tracingconnections among the users in the organization by traversing a directedgraph constructed from the user-by-user data and the file-by-file datato calculate connected user-file depth and to partition users in theorganization into unconnected user partitions; simulating the spread ofmalware, from an entry point user zero through the organization, via thecloud-based services, using the directed graph to simulate user exposureto, infection by, and transmission of the malware within theorganization; and producing a visualization of the spread from the entrypoint user zero, to users within a user partition to which the user zerobelongs, at varying transmission distances from the user zero determinedfrom the connected user-file depth.
 20. A non-transitory computerreadable storage medium impressed with computer program instructions tosimulate spread of malware through an organization of users who storeand collaborate on files on one or more cloud-based services, theinstructions, when executed on a processor, implement a methodcomprising: collecting user-by-user data and file-by-file data regardingthe users' interaction with the cloud-based services, including: forindividual users, collecting user endpoint location, user endpointvulnerability characteristics, and user file sharing information; forindividual file objects, collecting identities of users sharing the fileobjects, and user access privilege information; tracing connectionsamong the users in the organization by traversing a directed graphconstructed from the user-by-user data and the file-by-file data tocalculate connected user-file depth and to partition users in theorganization into unconnected user partitions; simulating the spread ofmalware, from an entry point user zero through the organization, via thecloud-based services, using the directed graph to simulate user exposureto, infection by, and transmission of the malware within theorganization; and producing a visualization of the spread from the entrypoint user zero, to users within a user partition to which the user zerobelongs, at varying transmission distances from the user zero determinedfrom the connected user-file depth.